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In recent years, the development of the doctrine of the right of
publicity' has gained significant attention from both courts and com-
2mentators. In essence, the doctrine protects the right of an individual,
especially a public celebrity, to reap the benefits of the commercial use
of his or her persona.' Because the right of publicity evolved from the
common law right of privacy,4 the right of publicity has often been
t This article is being published simultaneously in 14 Pacific Law Journal 181 (1983),
McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, Sacramento, California. Permission to
reprint is gratefully acknowledged.
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1. The first case articulating the phrase "the right of publicity" and correctly identify-
ing the values the right protects was Halean Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,
202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). See also Nimmer, The Right of
Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMPT. PROB. 203 (1954).
2. See generally Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977);
Factors Etc., v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), vacated on other grounds, 652
F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1973 (1982); Martin Luther King, Jr. Center
for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1981);
Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'don
other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Factors Etc. v. Creative Card Etc., Inc., 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors, 441 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Tenn. 1977), rev'd, 616 F.2d 956
(6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d
813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979). See also Felcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity
and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577 (1979); Note, Human
Cannonballs and the First Amendment.- Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 30
STAN. L. REV. 1185 (1978); Note, The Right of Publicity--Protection for Public Figures and
Celebrities, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 527 (1976); Gordon, Right oPrivacy in Name, Likeness,
Personality and History, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 553 (1960); J. GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION
AND PRACTICE, § 215 (1982) [hereinafter cited as GILSON].
3. For the purpose of this article, the term "persona" refers to a celebrated individual's
name, likeness, photograph, or image.
4. The right to privacy was initially defined in Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Pri-
vacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
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confused by courts as protecting the privacy interest an individual has
in his or her right to be left alone, rather than the commercial interest
an individual has in the right to exploit his or her persona. 5 The right
of publicity, which protects the commercial interest individuals (gener-
ally celebrities) have in their names and likenesses, is recognized today
as a right that is separate and distinct from the right of privacy. As a
result, certain general propositions circumscribing the right of publicity
have evolved, enabling courts to determine when a plaintiff will find
relief under a right of publicity claim.6 Nevertheless, just as most
courts agree with some of those general propositions, 7 some courts disa-
gree regarding other aspects of the right.
Not all jurisdictions recognizing the right of publicity allow the
right to survive the holder's death. Some courts require commercializa-
tion or exploitation of the celebrity's persona in order for the right to
survive,8 while other courts hold that regardless of exploitation the
5. For examples of earlier cases where the courts confused the protection of commer-
cial interests with the protection of privacy interests see Maritote v. Desilu Prods., Inc., 345
F.2d 418 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 883 (1965); O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d
167 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 823 (1942); James v. Screen Gems, Inc., 174 Cal.
App. 2d 650, 344 P.2d 799 (1959). The confusion between the commercial and the privacy
interests has been compounded by Dean Prosser's definition of the invasion of the right of
privacy. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 804 (4th ed. 1971).
Dean Prosser's fourth type of invasion of privacy, "of the appropriation, for the defendant's
benefit or advantages, of the plaintiffs name or likeness," id, caused some of the earlier
courts confronted with the issue to conclude that a celebrated plaintiff asserting a right of
privacy claim had no cause of action because the celebrity was only getting the publicity
which he sought. See Maritote, 345 F.2d 418. See also GILSON, supra note 2, §§ 2.15[4]&[5].
Section 652(c) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts echoes Dean Prosser's definition of
the right of privacy and, likewise, adds to the confusion. It states that "[olne who appropri-
ates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the
other for the invasion of his privacy." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(c) (1977).
While it is generally accepted that an action for the invasion of the right of privacy may only
be maintained by the living individual whose privacy was invaded, section 652(1) comment a
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, is an exception to the general rule and indicates that in
situations involving the commercial appropriation of an individual's name and likeness, an
action may survive that individual's death. The Restatement's survivability proviso departs
from Dean Prosser's view of the survivability issue.
6. See infra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
7. A majority of the courts addressing the right of publicity issue have characterized it
as a property right, thereby viewing the right as both alienable and descendible as are most
other property rights. See infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215; Groucho Marx Prods.,
Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485; Martin Luther King Jr. Center for Social
Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854; Hicks v. Casablanca
Records, 464 F. Supp. 426.
But see Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage
Prods., Inc., 51 U.S.L.W. 2308 (Ga. S. Ct. Oct. 28, 1982) (after the question concerning the
right of publicity was certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
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right is not survivable.9 In California, for example, where the need to
protect a celebrity's persona is particularly acute by virtue of the
number of celebrities in the jurisdiction, the California Supreme Court
nevertheless held in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures 0 that the right of pub-
licity does not survive the holder's death in any circumstance." Al-
though Lugosi represents the minority view regarding a descendible
right of publicity, and, in fact, an extreme position, that decision has a
tremendous impact on the large number of celebrities residing and
working in California.
As a result of Lugosi and similar vagaries attending the right of
publicity, a plaintiff seeking to protect the commercial interest in his or
her persona may be required to resort to a more traditional, judicially
acceptable cause of action such as a service mark infringement claim.
The service mark infringement claim is a viable alternative to a right of
publicity claim because both generally afford the aggrieved plaintiff the
same relief-an injunction which will halt the defendant's misappro-
priation of a person's name, symbol, likeness, image, or words.' 2 In
addition, it is generally easier to enjoin conduct infringing on a service
mark rather than conduct infringing on the right of publicity because
an identifiable economic loss is not required in the former,' 3 whereas it
is required in the latter.' 4
Recently, in Estate of Presley v. Russen, Judge Stanley S. Brot-
man of the Northern District of New Jersey exhaustively explored the
plaintiff's alternatives to a right of publicity claim. In that case the
cuit to the Georgia Supreme Court, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the right of pub-
licity is inheritable and devisable; the court found no compelling reason to require the right
to be exploited in order for it to survive the holder's death).
9. See Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors, 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
953 (1980); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323
(1979).
10. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979) (en banc).
11. Id at 824, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
12. Compare Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510
F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975) (injunction issued to protect the name
and configuration of a professional hockey team's service mark); Caesars World, Inc. v.
Caesar's Palace, 490 F. Supp. 818 (D.N.J. 1980) (injunction issued to protect the name and
design of the service mark "Caesar's Palace"); Fotomat Corp. v. Photo Drive-Thru, Inc., 425
F. Supp. 693 (D.N.J. 1977) (injunction issued to protect the name and design of the service
mark "Fotomat") with Pro Arts, 579 F.2d 215 (injunction issued under a right of publicity
claim to halt the sale of Elvis Presley posters); Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. 523 F. Supp. 485
(injunction issued to enjoin the presentation of a Broadway show); Creative Card, 444 F.
Supp. 279 (injunction issued to stop the sale of Elvis Presley posters).
13. See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
15. 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).
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plaintiff, the estate of the late entertainer Elvis Presley, moved for a
preliminary injunction against the defendant, Russen, the producer of a
live stage show patterned after a Presley performance.' 6 In pertinent
part, the estate alleged both a violation of its right of publicity and a
common law service mark infringement. 7 The infringement at issue
was the promotion and presentation of "The Big El Show," which was
billed as a "Tribute to Elvis Presley.""8 The estate sought to prelimina-
rily enjoin both the actual stage presentation and the production and
sale of "Big El Show" albums, pendants, and buttons bearing the like-
ness of Elvis Presley.' 9 The estate claimed that Russen's use of Pres-
ley's name and likeness reduced the estate's ability to license the
Presley image and caused confusion in the eyes of the consuming pub-
lic as to the source of the entertainment services.2 °
The court evaluated the estate's claims under the standards for
16. Id at 1344. The preliminary injunction was sought pursuant to Rule 65 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. The estate's ultimate goal was to permanently enjoin Rus-
sen's stage show as well as the attendant sale of record albums, pendants, buttons, etc. In
addition, the estate sought an impounding of the advertising materials which promoted Rus-
sen's show, an accounting of Russen's profits, and an award of reasonable attorney fees. Id.
17. Id The estate also alleged that Russen violated both section 43(a) of the Lanham
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976) (federal trademark law) and the New Jersey
common law of unfair competition. Id After granting an injunction on the common law
service mark infringement claim, the Estate ofPresley court was not compelled to exhaus-
tively address the practicality of either the section 43(a) claim or the unfair competition
claim as alternatives to a right of publicity claim. Thus, both the section 43(a) claim and the
unfair competition claim are beyond the scope of this article and will not be addressed here.
To prove a bona fide common law service mark infringement, the estate needed to
establish two elements: first, that the estate had a valid service mark in Elvis Presley's per-
sona which was recognized by members of the consuming public, and second, that Russen's
activity either was likely to confuse members of the public as to the source of the entertain-
ment services or caused the estate to suffer an identifiable economic loss. See also infra notes
113-56 and accompanying text.
18. 513 F. Supp. at 1349. The court recognized three factors critical to the estate's com-
mon law service mark infringement claim. First, Russen never entered into any licensing
agreements with the estate in connection with the advertising or promotion of either the
stage show or dther related goods (i.e., record albums, pendants, buttons, etc.). Id. at 1350.
This fact eliminated any solace Russen may have enjoyed with a defensive claim of either
laches or acquiescence. Second, the court recognized that Russen's production was not
merely a modest mimicry of an Elvis Presley production. Rather, it was a full scale imita-
tion patterned after an actual Elvis Presley stage show. Id. at 1348. Finally, the court con-
cluded that 'Big El Show' promotional material and bona fide Elvis Presley records and
promotional material were confusingly similar. Id at 1349-50. These final two conclusions
were essential elements to the estate's common law service mark infringement claim-that a
reasonable consumer was likely to be confused as to the source of the entertainment services.
See also infra notes 182-93 and accompanying text.
19. 513 F. Supp. at 1344.
20. Id at 1362.
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granting a preliminary injunction 21 and concluded that the estate had
made an adequate showing that it would succeed on the merits on all
four counts.22 The court concluded, however, that the estate failed in
its right of publicity claim to show that it would meet the second pre-
liminary injunction requirement, a showing of irreparable injury.23
Despite the failure of the right of publicity claim, the court nevertheless
issued a preliminary injunction because the requisite irreparable injury
was established in the estate's remaining claims 24 -infringement of the
estate's service marks and unfair competition.25
This article will examine the Estate of Presley court's decision to
grant relief on the Presley estate's service mark claim and explore how
plaintiffs seeking to protect the commercial interest in their names and
likenesses may do so with the more traditional service mark infringe-
ment cause of action. Part I will discuss the development of the right of
publicity and identify some of the infirmities attending the right of
publicity as it is currently recognized. Part II will discuss the common
21. A preliminary injunction is an injunction issued to protect the status quo of the liti-
gants. See Burton v. Matanuska Valley Lines, Inc., 244 F.2d 647, 650 (9th Cir. 1957). It also
protects the plaintiff from irreparable injury and preserves the court's ability to render a
meaningful decision after a trial on the merits. In order to prevail on a motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction, generally the plaintiff must establish four elements: that there is a signifi-
cant threat of irreparable injury to the plaintiff if the injunction is not granted; that the
injury to the defendant if an injunction is issued is less than the injury to the plaintiff if an
injunction is not issued; that the plaintiff has a probability of success on the merits; and that
the public interest favors the granting of the injunction. See Lungrin v. Claytor, 619 F.2d
61, 63 (10th Cir. 1980); National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. v. Burke, 608 F.2d 819, 823 (1st
Cir. 1979); Ekanem v. Health & Hosp. Corp. 589 F.2d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1978); see also II
C. Wright & A. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 2948 at 430-31 (1973). But see
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979)
(preliminary injunction is appropriate where plaintiff establishes possible irreparable harm
and either probable success on the merits or sufficiently serious questions going to the merits
to make them a fair ground for litigation or a balance of hardships tipping in the plaintiff's
favor). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' test for a preliminary injunction is slightly
different. In the Ninth Circuit the party requesting a preliminary injunction must first show
that there is a probability of success and a possibility of irreparable injury. Then that party
must demonstrate that serious questions are raised and that the balance of hardships are
tipped sharply in its favor. See Miss Universe, Inc. v. Flesher, 605 F.2d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir.
1979).
22. 513 F. Supp. at 1382.
23. Id. at 1378. Irreparable injury is generally equated with a showing of an identifiable
economic loss. See, e.g., Brown v. Choate, 411 U.S. 452 (1973); National Tank Truck Carri-
ers, Inc., 608 F.2d at 829; G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prods. Safety Comm'n, 404 F.
Supp. 352, 373 (D. Del. 1975).
24. 513 F. Supp. at 1380-81.
25. Id at 1382. The Estate of Presley court found that the two remaining injunction
requirements, a balance of the equities and a showing of a public interest, were met. Id. at
1381-82.
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law service mark infringement action as an alternative to a right of
publicity claim and will outline the essential elements which must be
established in order for a court to conclude that a valid and protectable
service mark exists. Part III will discuss how the Estate ofPresley court
employed the principles of service mark law to issue a preliminary in-
junction which halted Russen's misappropriation of the estate's service
marks.
I. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The right of publicity may be defined as an individual's right to
have "personal control over [the] commercial display and exploitation
of his [or her] personality and the exercise of his [or her] talents."26
This right has evolved over the last three decades to protect a celeb-
rity's investment of the time, energy, and money expended to create a
marketable commodity-his or her persona. Although traditionally a
celebrity's reward for the creation of a persona was an increase in his or
her appeal to the public, the endorsement and licensing opportunities
recently available to popular celebrities has vastly increased the com-
mercial worth of the persona created. The right of publicity is designed
to afford celebrities the exclusive right to capitalize on that
investment.27
A. The Origin and Development of the Right of Publicity
In some of the earlier cases addressing the unauthorized commer-
cial use of an individual's persona, the courts almost uniformly denied
recovery because the right of publicity was often confused with the
26. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 569 (1977) (citations
omitted).
27. Recognizing the exponentially growing endorsement and licensing opportunities for
prominent individuals, Chief Justice Bird of the California Supreme Court recently stated in
her Lugosi dissent:
Today it is commonplace for individuals to promote or advertise commercial
services or products or. . .even have their identities infused in the products. Indi-
viduals prominent in athletics, business, entertainment and the arts, for example,
are frequently involved in such enterprises. . . . As a result, the sale of one's per-
sona in connection with the promotion of commercial products has unquestionably
become big business. ...
Such commercial use of an individual's identity is intended to increase the
value or sales of the product by fusing the celebrity's identity with the product and
thereby siphoning some of the publicity value or good will in the celebrity's per-
sona into the product. This use is premised, in part, on public recognition and
association with that person's name or likeness, or an ability to create such
recognition.
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d at 834, 603 P.2d at 437-38, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 335-36
(Bird, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
[Vol. 2
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right of privacy. In O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co. ,28 for instance, the plain-
tiff, a famous football player, failed in his attempt to assert either a
right to prevent the use of his picture on a calendar advertising beer or
a right to recover for the advertising value of his photograph.29 In
denying relief, the court concluded that as a celebrity O'Brien had for-
feited his right of privacy, and thus, there was no actionable wrong.3°
The court further posited that O'Brien was only getting the publicity
that he sought.3 ' Judge Holmes, however, dissented, recognizing that
although O'Brien may have pleaded the wrong theory, invasion of pri-
vacy, an athlete has a pecuniary interest in his or her name and
likeness.32
Judge Holmes' dissent was vindicated in Halean Laboratories, Inc.
v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. , the first case to articulate the phrase "the
right of publicity" and clearly identify the commercial interests the
right was designed to protect. The Halean court recognized the right of
an individual to protect the publicity value of his or her photograph.34
The plaintiff in Halean, a bubble gum manufacturer, had contracted
with several professional baseball players for the exclusive right to use
the ballplayers' photograph in connection with the sale of its product.
35
Subsequently, the plaintiff sued the defendant for inducing the players
to breach their contracts with the plaintiff and enter into similar con-
tracts with the defendant.36 The defendant argued that the plaintiff
had no legal interest in the publication of the players' photographs be-
28. 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 823 (1942).
29. ld. at 170.
30. Id at 169.
31. Id
32. Id at 170-71 (Holmes, J., dissenting). It was this critical distinction which the
O'Brien majority and other courts were not prepared to recognize. Compare Maritote v.
Desilu Prods. Inc., 345 F.2d 418 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 883 (1965) (Al Capone's
widow and son sued for unjust enrichment based on defendant's use of Al Capone's name
and likeness in the television series "The Untouchables," and failed because the court con-
cluded that plaintiffs were attempting to assert the privacy rights of a deceased person) and
Carson v. National Bank of Commerce Trust & Savings, 501 F.2d 1082 (8th Cir. 1974)
(court rejected Johnny Carson's claim against a travel agency for damages based on the
unauthorized use of his name and picture on the ground that Nebraska state law did not yet
recognize the right of privacy, and no cases were found distinguishing a protectable right of
publicity) with Edison v. Edison Polyform, 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67 A. 392 (1907) (plaintiff, the
famous inventor Thomas Edison, successfully enjoined the activities of a company which
sold medicinal products under the name Edison--the court identified the exclusive commer-
cial interest an individual has in his or her name and likeness).
33. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
34. Id at 868.
35. Id at 867.
36. Id
1982]
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yond the player's right to privacy, a right courts traditionally had
deemed as personal to the individual. 37 The court rejected the defend-
ant's claim and concluded that the athletes had assigned a right of pub-
licity that was separate and distinct from the right of privacy.38 The
court also reasoned that this right is concerned with the pecuniary in-
terests involved and affords judicial protection to individuals (generally
prominent persons) wishing to receive money for the exclusive endorse-
ment of goods and services. 39 Thus, the right of publicity bars other
advertisers from using an individual's name, likeness, photograph, or
image. 0
The pinnacle of judicial recognition of the right of publicity was
reached when the United States Supreme Court interpreted the Ohio
common law right of publicity in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad-
casting Co. 4 The plaintiff in that case, an entertainer, performed a
"human cannonball" act in which he was shot from a cannon into a
net. 2 Without Zacchini's consent, a local television station filmed his
entire fifteen-second act and broadcasted the film clip on the evening
news. 3 Zacchini sued for damages alleging that the news broadcast
violated his right of publicity." The United States Supreme Court
agreed and upheld Zacchini's claim. 5 The Zacchini Court identified
37. Id at 868.
38. Id
39. Id
40. Several courts have reached similar conclusions and protected the right of celebrities
to grant exclusive licenses for their persona, although these courts did not necessarily em-
ploy the phrase "the right of publicity." See, e.g., Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds To-
bacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974) (professional race car driver's right of publicity
grants him an exclusive proprietary interest in his own identity); Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415
F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969) (professional baseball player has a valuable property right in his
name, photograph, and image and may grant to another the exclusive right to use his name
and photo); Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956) (prizefighter has "right of action" against television station
where television station broadcasted an old film clip of prizefight without his consent);
Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970) (baseball players have proprie-
tary interest in their names, sporting activities, and accomplishments which enables players
to enjoin manufacturer of baseball table games from using players' names without a license);
Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters, Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (1967) (professional golf-
ers could recover damages where defendant exploited and commercialized golfer's names,
reputations, and accomplishments in connection with defendant's golf table game); Hogan v.
A.S. Barnes & Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. 314 (Pa. C.P. 1957) (professional golfer has enforceable
property right in his name and photograph).
41. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
42. Id. at 563.
43. Id. at 564.
44. Id
45. Id. at 578.
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and protected two critical values: the proprietary interest an individual
has in his or her act46 and the prevention of unjust enrichment as a
result of the theft of goodwill by third parties.47 Drawing a parallel to
federal patent and copyright laws,48 the Court concluded that the right
of publicity protection provides the economic incentive for an individ-
ual to make the investment required to produce an act of interest to the
public.4 9 Moreover, the Court recognized that there was no justifica-
tion for allowing the defendant to get free of charge that for which he
or she would normally have to pay.50
The Zacchini decision is important not only because it is the first
Supreme Court decision recognizing the right of publicity but also be-
cause it advances the fundamental property interests that are deeply
rooted in our economic and judicial system. Providing economic in-
centives for creative individuals and protecting their interests from un-
just interference on the part of third parties is an essential element in
the development of commercial, artistic, athletic, and entertainment en-
deavors, and as Zacchini illustrates, those interests are not solely con-
fined to the area of patent and copyright law.
B. Survivability of the Right of Publicity
Whether the right of publicity survives a person's death is impor-
tant because in jurisdictions which have some type of limitation on the
survivability of the right of publicity, it may be necessary for the plain-
tiff to resort to an alternative to that right when unable to satisfy the
limitation.5 The modem trend has been to recognize that the right of
publicity is like any other property right. As such, it is fully alienable
46. Id at 575.
47. Id at 576.
48. Consideration of the federal copyright statute, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1976), is important
for identifying the values that are protected by the statutory scheme and for developing a
workable time frame within which the right of publicity would survive after the celebrity's
death. Although they are analogous, the right of publicity and copyright protection are not
equivalent; a copyright protects a creator from the taking of specific expressions or arrange-
ments, whereas the right of publicity protects against unauthorized appropriation of an indi-
vidual's persona which would result in unearned commercial gain to another. See Factors
Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 287 (2d Cir. 1981) (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
49. 433 U.S. at 576.
50. Id.
51. For an exhaustive exploration of the survivability problems associated with the right
of publicity, see Sims, Right of Publicity: Survivability Reconsidered, 49 FORDHAM L. REV.
453 (1981); Felcher & Rubin, The Descendibility of the Right of Publicity: Is There Commer-
cial Life After Death?, 89 YALE L.J. 1125 (1980). Comment, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures.-
Descent of the Right of Publicity, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 751 (1978). See also GILSON, supra note
2, § 2.15[4].
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and survivable.52 In Factors Etc. v. Pro Arts, Inc. , for example, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld an in-
junction against the unauthorized sale of a memorial poster bearing the
likeness of Elvis Presley and concluded that Elvis Presley's right of
publicity survived his death.5" The court recognized that during his
lifetime Presley had licensed his right of publicity to a corporation
which in turn licensed its rights to the plaintiff following Presley's
death.5 The theoretical foundation upon which the court held that the
right was assignable and not extinguished by Presley's death was the
purely commercial nature of the protected right.5 6 Since the court rec-
ognized that the exclusive right to profit from a celebrity's name and
likeness was a transferable interest in property, the court held that this
factor "compel[led] the conclusion that the right survive[d] the celeb-
rity's death."" The court distinguished claims based on the right of
privacy which do not survive because they are enforced solely to pre-
vent injury to feelings.
5 8
Some courts have held that regardless of exploitation, the right of
publicity does not survive the holder's death.59 Thus, in Memphis De-
velopment Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc. ,60 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that under Tennessee law, Elvis
Presley's right of publicity did not survive his death.6' In its opinion
the court asserted that the right of publicity is similar to other "per-
sonal attributes" which are not inheritable such as titles and offices,
52. See supra note 51.
53. 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), vacated on other grounds, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1973 (1982).
54. Id at 222.
55. Id at 221-22.
56. Id
57. Id at 221.
58. Id. at 222. See also supra note 51. The survivability of the right of publicity finds
additional support in the longstanding judicial policies of preventing unjust enrichment by
the theft of another's goodwill and encouraging the investment of effort and creativity. See
Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576. The Pro Arts court recognized that to hold that Elvis Presley's
death extinguished the right that was purchased by the plaintiff would grant a windfall to
competitors and render the exclusive right virtually worthless. 579 F.2d at 221.
59. Some courts have avoided taking this drastic position because of the circumstances
of the respective cases. See, e.g., Pro Arts, 579 F.2d at 222 n. II (because right was exploited
during celebrity's lifetime, court had no need to decide whether the right would survive
celebrity's death absent such exploitation); Martin Luther King, 508 F. Supp. at 864 (because
right was not exploited during celebrity's lifetime, the court need not decide whether right
was devisable).
60. 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
61. Id at 962.
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friendship, trust, and employment contracts.62 Although the court
identified the policy underlying the right of publicity as "the encour-
agement of effort and creativity, '"63 the court failed to address the com-
mercial and assignable nature of that right.64
A similar result was reached in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures.65 In
Lugosi the California Supreme Court evaluated a right of publicity
claim advanced by the heirs of the late actor Bela Lugosi against Uni-
versal Pictures.66 The heirs claimed that Lugosi created a right of pub-
licity in the Count Dracula character, which he portrayed in a series of
Universal Films. The court viewed the heirs' claim essentially as an
invasion of the right of privacy claim and held that "the right to exploit
[one's] name and likeness is personal to the artist and must be exer-
cised, if at all, by him during his lifetime.
67
62. Id. at 959. This analogy was incorrect because, unlike these personal attributes, cel-
ebrated names and faces have a publicity value that is regularly exploited to sell commercial
products through mass-marketing techniques. While trust per se cannot be sold, the right to
use a name or likeness that inspires trust in a product or service, like the right to use a
service mark which has goodwill, can be.
63. Id at 958.
64. Id. at 957. The Memphis Development decision failed to recognize that in our com-
mercial society, the ability to pass on the fruits of one's work to one's heirs spurs America's
producers to create new wealth. See Factors, Etc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 287 (2d
Cir. 1981) (Mansfield, J., dissenting) ("To maintain as Memphis Development did, that "leav-
ing a good name to one's children is sufficient reward in itself for the individual,' .. consti-
tutes a rather heavy burden to impose on creativity," (citation omitted)).
The continuing viability of Memphis Development has been seriously questioned. In
1981, in an unpublished opinion, a Tennessee chancery court held that under Tennessee law
there exists a survivable right of publicity. See Commerce Union Bank v. Coors of Cumber-
land, Inc., 551 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) A-3 (Oct. 2, 1981). In 1982, how-
ever, another Tennessee chancery court held that the right of publicity is not survivable
under Tennessee law. See Lancaster v. Factors Etc., Inc., No. 88927-2 (Shelby Co. Ch. Ct.
Nov. 24, 1982). Prior to Commerce Union and Lancaster the Second Circuit had deferred to
the Sixth Circuit's Memphis Development decision in a case concerning the right of publicity
in Tennessee. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 1973 (1982) (Factors II). After Commerce Union and Lancaster, however,
the plaintiffs in Factors 1H petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit for a rehearing alleging that there was evidence that Tennessee recognized a surviv-
able right of publicity. Although the Second Circuit ultimately denied the petition on the
ground that there is no dispositive ruling regarding the survivability of the right of publicity
in Tennessee, see Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., No. 80-7692, slip op. at 3-4 (2d Cir. Jan.
12, 1983), the mere existence of two clearly conflicting lower court decisions indicates that
there is serious doubt regarding the survivability of Tennessee's right of publicity.
65. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 602 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
66. Id at 816-17, 603 P.2d at 427, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
67. Id. at 824, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329 (emphasis added). Throughout the
opinion the court took judicial notice of the fact that, during his lifetime, Lugosi had never
exploited his name or likeness in connection with any business, product, or service. See id
at 818-20, 603 P.2d at 428-29, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326-27. The court postulated that Lugosi
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The court was persuaded by Dean Prosser's definition of the right
of privacy, and concluded that death terminated Lugosi's right of pub-
licity and released his name into the public domain.6" The court justi-
fied a rule of nondescendibility because, in its view, the right was
personal and because courts would have difficulty in selecting an ap-
propriate durational limit within which the right would survive.6 9
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit applied the Lugosi decision in Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v.
Day and Night Company, Inc. 70 and held that the Marx Brothers' rights
of publicity did not survive their death." In Groucho Marx Produc-
tions the heirs and assignees of the Marx Brothers' rights of publicity
asserted that the right protected against the production of the Broad-
could have exploited his right of publicity if he had sold "commercial tie-ups," id. at 818 n.5,
603 P.2d at 428 n.5, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326 n.5, such as endorsements or licenses to his name,
face, or likeness.
The court's extensive discussion about exploitation leads one to conclude that the court
would have been compelled to find a survivable right of publicity if Lugosi had exploited his
right of publicity during his lifetime. This conclusion is erroneous. The exploitation discus-
sion was predicated at the outset of the opinion on an understanding of California unfair
competition laws. Stated simply, the Lugosi court said that the right of publicity will not
survive in any circumstance; however, in the event that the individual's name has achieved a
"secondary meaning" in the public's eyes, see infra notes 144-52, then the individual's estate
or heirs may raise an unfair competition claim. Since service mark law is a part of the
broader law of unfair competition, the Lugosi unfair competition proviso is yet another
reason why the Estaie of Presley service mark infringement action is a viable alternative for
would-be California right of publicity litigants.
Two days after the Lugosi decision was released, the California Supreme Court summa-
rily affirmed the Lugosi rationale in Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860,
603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979). In that case the plaintiff, the nephew of the late
actor Rudolph Valentino, claimed that the defendant's television program depicting Valen-
tino's life violated Valentino's right of publicity. As Valentino's legal heir, Guglielmi argued
that he was the present owner of the right and was entitled to damages and injunctive relief.
The court denied recovery. Stating that Lugosi controlled, the court held that "the right [of
publicity] is not descendible and expires on the death of the person so protected." Id at 861,
603 P.2d at 455, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
68. 25 Cal. 3d at 820, 603 P.2d at 429, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 327. As explained supra at note
5, Dean Prosser's position that the commercial misappropriation of one's name and likeness
constitutes an invasion of the right of privacy is a position shared by few.
69. 25 Cal. 3d at 823 n.8, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. 329. If one accepts that the
right of publicity, despite its genesis, is a right which protects against unfair competition,
then the concerns expressed by the Lugosi court about the duration of the right are easily
answered; the right of publicity, just as a service mark or a trademark right, exists only as
long as the mark is used and not abandoned. See, e.g., United Drug Co. v. Theodore
Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (the right of a trademark is not a right in gross; it exists
only as a right appurtenant to an established business for the protection of the business'
goodwill).
70. 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
71. Id. at 318.
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way play "A Day in Hollywood/A Night in the Ukraine."72 Conclud-
ing that New York law governed, the district court held that the heirs
and assignees had asserted a valid right of publicity claim.73 The Sec-
ond Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred in its conclu-
sion that New York law applied."4 The court of appeals reasoned that,
under the circumstances, California law should have been applied.7-
Thus, the court of appeals looked to Lugosi and its progeny for the
operative law governing the descendibility issue.76
The Second Circuit exhaustively analyzed the rationale and hold-
ing in Lugosi. Recognizing that there is some confusion regarding the
language employed by the Lugosi court, the Second Circuit noted that
the "secondary meaning" discussion in Lugosi "is the language of
trademark [and service mark] law."77 The Second Circuit posited that
this language may have been designed to relegate a celebrity's heirs
and assignees solely to their rights under trademark (and service mark)
law.78 It is critical to note that instead of foreclosing all avenues of
relief for the heirs and assignees of a celebrity by recognizing "that
California does not recognize any descendible right of publicity," 79 the
Second Circuit concluded that "the heirs [or assignees] of a celebrity
[may] rely on trademark [or service mark] law"8 to protect the com-
mercial interest in the celebrity's name and likeness. 8'
72. Id at 318-19.
73. 523 F. Supp. 485, 487 n.I (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The district court reasoned that New
York law governed since the injury occurred in New York, the defendants were New York
residents, the play ran in New York longer than anywhere else, and the Marx Brothers'
characters were originally developed and perfected in New York. Id
74. 689 F.2d at 319.
75. Id at 319-20. The circuit court rejected the reasons which the district court cited in
concluding that New York law governed. See supra note 73. Instead, the Second Circuit
was persuaded by, among other things, the facts that all three of the Marx brothers were
California residents at the time of their death, the plaintiff, Groucho Marx Productions, is a
California corporation and plaintiff Susan Marx was a California resident, and Groucho
Marx, while in California, assigned his right of publicity to Groucho Marx Productions. Id
at 320.
76. Id at 319-23.
77. Id at 322 (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. ,20 (1961)). For a distinction between service marks and trademarks see
infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
78. 689 F.2d at 322.
79. Id at 323.
80. Id.
81. The court suggested that in addition to the trademark interpretation, Lugosi may be
subject to a second interpretation. Under this alternative interpretation, Lugosi may mean
that California recognizes a descendible right of publicity, but it is limited solely to the use
of the celebrity's name and likeness in connection with any product or service that the celeb-
rity promoted by exploiting his right of publicity during his lifetime. Id By definition, the
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The Groucho Marx Productions court is the first court to suggest
that as a means to circumvent Lugosi, an heir or an assignee may find
relief under a trademark or service mark infringement claim. This de-
cision is persuasive authority for the proposition that a would-be right
of publicity litigant should assert, in addition to or instead of, a right of
publicity claim, a common law trademark or service mark infringement
claim.
C Right of Publicity Conclusion
Although the right of publicity has received widespread judicial
recognition going as high as the United States Supreme Court,82 the
right of publicity vagaries that exist in some jurisdictions necessitate
that plaintiffs seeking to protect the commercial interest in their per-
sona plead an additional, alternative cause of action. As Section II will
illustrate, a viable alternative cause of action which may grant the re-
quested relief is the service mark infringement claim.
II. COMMON LAW SERVICE MARK INFRINGEMENT ALTERNATIVE
When a plaintiff has failed to establish a valid right of publicity
claim, either because those elements necessary for a preliminary in-
junction to issue have not been established83 or because the jurisdiction
places some limitation on the right of publicity, it becomes necessary
for the plaintiff to resort to another cause of action which will protect
his or her pecuniary interest in his or her name and likeness. One such
alternative cause of action to the right of publicity claim is a common
law service mark infringement claim.
Service marks are protected under both federal and state laws.84
The Lanham Trademark Act of 194685 provides protection under the
federal system while the California Trademark Law affords protection
for trademarks, service marks, and trade names under the laws of Cali-
second interpretation is more restrictive than the trademark interpretation. In the "exploita-
tion" interpretation, the use of the celebrity's name and likeness may be applied only to
those products and services that the celebrity authorized during his lifetime, while under the
trademark interpretation, service marks and trademarks may be used in connections with
goods and services that are developed and endorsed after the celebrity's death.
82. See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
84. A leading commentator on trademarks and service marks has noted that most states
provide for registration of trademarks and service marks used in that state. See J. MCCAR-
THY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, §§ 22:1, 22:5 (1973) (hereinafter cited as
MCCARTHY). See also Stroup, A Practical Guide to the Protection of Artists Through Copy-
right, Trade Secret, Patent, and Trademark Law, 3 COMM/ENT L.J. 189, 217-24 (1981).
85. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976).
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fornia.86 Although both the federal and the California systems of
trademark protection permit the owner of a valid service mark to regis-
ter a mark, 7 in the event the owner fails to register the mark, he or she
is nevertheless given full protection over the mark.88 Frequently, the
owner of a service mark will have a cause of action under both the state
law and the Lanham Act.
In the common law a service mark is defined as any name, word,
symbol, device, or any combination thereof used in connection with the
sale or advertising of the services of one person to distinguish them
from the services of others.89 Historically, service marks were designed
to indicate the origin of services.9" They were intended both to assist
86. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 14200-14325 (West 1964).
87. See 15 U.S.C. § 1053 (1976) (federal registration of service marks); CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE §§ 14220-14233 (registration of service marks in California).
88. Under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976), a service mark
does not have to be registered to be afforded protection. Under section 14203 of the Califor-
nia Business and Professional Code, a "mark" as used in the Trademark Act "includes any
trademark or service mark entitled to registration pursuant to . . . [the Trademark Act]
whether registered or not." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14203 (emphasis added).
Although not required, it is strongly suggested that the owner of any valid and legally
protectable service mark endeavor to register that mark under the state trademark statute,
the Lanham Act, or both. Registration of a mark has several legal and strategic advantages.
Under the state law registration serves as prima facie proof of ownership, places others on
constructive notice of a claim of ownership so as to eliminate any defense of good faith in
adopting an infringing mark, and serves as a powerful bargaining chip in settlement negotia-
tions. When a service mark owner registers that mark under the Lanham Act, in addition to
the advantages outlined above, the owner is entitled to bring his or her case in federal court
and be able to recover profits, damages, costs, and treble damages. See MCCARTHY, supra
note 84, §§ 19:5, 22:1; GILSON, supra note 2, §§ 4.01-4.04, 4.06.
89. Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesar's Palace, 490 F. Supp. 818, 823-24 (D.N.J. 1980). Fre-
quently, the terms service mark and trademark are used interchangeably. Although the gen-
eral principles governing service mark infringement are also applicable in a trademark
infringement, see Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510
F.2d 1004, 1009 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975); Fotomat Corp. v. Photo Drive-
Thru, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 693, 702-03 (D.N.J. 1977), it is important to note that a service mark
identifies a service while a trademark identifies a good. See generally Caesars World, 490 F.
Supp. 818. See also GILSON, supra note 2, § 3.02[11. Under the California Trademark Law
a service mark is defined as "a mark used in the sale or advertising of services to identify the
services of one person and distinguish them from the services of others." CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 14206 (West 1964).
90. See McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245 (1878) (an infringement would be found after a
showing by plaintiff that members of the public exercising ordinary caution are likely to be
misled into buying an article believing that the article is manufactured by plaintiff). See also
Victor Tool & Machine Corp. v. Sun Control Awnings, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 868 (E.D. Mich.
1968), ajf'd, 411 F.2d 792 (6th Cir. 1969) (after fifteen uninterrupted years of employing the
mark "Sun Control," the public recognized and distinguished defendant's goods and serv-
ices as emanating from a particular source); Stork Restaurant Inc. v. Marcus, 36 F. Supp. 90
(E.D. Pa. 1941) (where plaintiff operated a restaurant named "The Stork Club" and defend-
ant subsequently operated and promoted a restaurant under the same name, a violation of
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customers in the identification of the services they sought9' and to pre-
vent competitors from "palming off" their services.92
A successful common law service mark infringement action ex-
tends protection of the owner of the mark one step beyond that protec-
tion afforded in a right of publicity claim. In the former, the plaintiff
asserts that he or she owns a valid and protectable service mark and
that the defendant's subsequent use of the same or similar mark to
identify its services either infringed on the plaintif's service mark or is
likely to cause confusion as to the origin of the goods or services.93
Because service mark laws exist not to protect the service mark per se,
but rather to achieve the twin goals of protecting the right of the con-
suming public to be free from confusion and the right of the owner to
control his or her service's reputation,94 a plaintiff asserting a service
mark infringement need not show an identifiable economic loss. In-
stead, the plaintiff only needs to show a likelihood of confusion as to
the source.95
On the other hand, in the right of publicity context, because the
right is designed to protect the commercial value of the celebrity's
trademarks and service marks would be found because of the resulting confusion to the
public).
91. Howard Dustless Duster Co. v. Carleton, 219 F. 913 (D. Conn. 1915) (defendant's
packaging and selling of dustcloths would be enjoined where packaging deceived the public
into believing product was that of plaintiff's).
92. Generally, the phrase "palming off" means the practice by a commercial competitor
of deceiving the public into purchasing its (the competitor's) services under the mistaken
belief that the), are offered by another (usually the plaintiff). Compco Corp. v. Day-Bright
Lighting, Inc., 3,6 U.S. 234, 238 (1964).
93. See Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1229-30 (3d Cir.
1978); Caesar's World, 490 F. Supp. 818, 823-24; Fotomat, 425 F. Supp. 693, 702-03; Time
Mechanisms, Inc. v. Qonaar Corp., 422 F. Supp. 905, 915 (D.N.J. 1976).
94. James Burrough, Ltd v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274-76 (7th Cir.
1976), rev'd on other grounds on retrial, 572 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1978).
95. See James Burrough, 540 F.2d at 275-76 (plaintiff, a distiller, was not required to
show that defendant's (a restaurant owner's) infringing mark caused plaintiff to suffer an
economic loss; instead, plaintiff only needed to show that a viewer of the infringing mark
would be likely to associate that mark with the plaintiff's goods or services); Playboy Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 414, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (because
of a trademark's unique function in representing intangible assets such as reputation and
goodwill, plaintiff only needed to show a high probability of confusion in order to satisfy the
irreparable injury requirement of a preliminary injunction); Russ Berrie & Co. v. Jerry Els-
ner Co., 482 F. Supp. 980, 990 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (if a likelihood of confusion is established in
a trademark infringement case, irreparable injury is presumed, notwithstanding a showing
of monetary loss); Louis Rich, Inc. v. Horace W. Longacre, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 1327, 1338
(E.D. Pa. 1976) (to prevail on a trademark infringement claim, plaintiff only needed to show
that defendant's infringing mark was likely to cause confusion with plaintiffs marks). See
also MCCARTHY, supra note 84, § 30:18; GILSON, supra note 2, § 5.01.
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name and likeness,96 the plaintiff must not only show that he or she
owns the right and that he or she is likely to succeed on the merits, but
must also show with sufficient certainty that the defendant's infringe-
ment caused or is likely to cause an identifiable economic loss. 97 Often,
this is an onerous burden for the plaintiff to meet, and as a result, the
plaintiff's right of publicity claim may fail. 98
Individuals, particularly entertainers and professional athletes,
may acquire service mark or trademark protection for their names,
99
nicknames,1o° photographs, likenesses, or images.' 0 ' A valid service
mark protects the holder of the mark against another's use of the mark
in connection with the offering of similar services. For example, if an
entertainer advertises and promotes his or her show under his or her
name and the consuming public recognizes that the production is one
performed by that entertainer, another's subsequent, unauthorized use
of that entertainer's name in connection with the promotion and pres-
entation of a second show is a violation of the entertainer's service
mark. In addition to offering entertainment services, that same enter-
tainer may license his or her name and photograph to a manufacturer
for the production of tee-shirts bearing his or her name and likeness. A
subsequent, unauthorized manufacturer's production of the same or
96. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 23.
98. Of course, if this is always the case, the obvious question becomes, "Why does a
plaintiff assert a right of publicity claim when he or she could find relief under the alterna-
tive service mark infringement claim?" It is the authors' position that because of the novelty
of the service mark infringement action and because of the twin obstacles of proving a valid
service mark and showing a likelihood of confusion, a plaintiff may feel more secure resort-
ing to a right of publicity claim. After Estate of Presley, however, it is more likely that a
plaintiff will be more receptive to the service mark infringement alternative.
99. In order for one's name to become a service mark under the common law, the indi-
vidual must show that his or her name has achieved what is referred to as a "secondary
meaning." That is, a substantial number of the consuming public associates the entertainer's
personal name as a symbol which identifies and distinguishes his or her services from those
offered by others. The secondary meaning requirement is more fully discussed infra at notes
144-56 and accompanying text. See also MCCARTHY, supra note 84, § 13:2; GILSON, supra
note 2, § 2.08.
100. See Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129 (1979)
(former football player's nickname "Crazylegs" was protectable under a trade name in-
fringement action).
101. See, e.g., In re Carson, 197 U.S.P.Q. 554 (T.T.A.B. 1977) (the name "Johnnie Car-
son" is a valid service mark which identifies a comedian of that name); Five Platters, Inc. v.
Purdie, 419 F. Supp. 372 (D. Md. 1976) (the name "The Platters" is a valid service mark
which identifies a singing group); In re Folk, 160 U.S.P.Q. 213 (T.T.A.B. 1968) (the fictitious
name "The Lollipop Princess" is a valid service mark which identifies a storyteller); In re
Ames, 160 U.S.P.Q. 214 (T.T.A.B. 1968) (the name "Neal Ford & The Fanatics" is a valid
service mark which identifies a group of performers).
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similar tee-shirts would be a violation of the entertainer's common law
trademark rights.
°2
A successful service mark infringement action is predicated on a
showing that the plaintiff owned the mark, that the defendant's in-
fringement was likely to confuse or deceive the consuming public, and
that the names or symbols are valid, legally protectable service
marks. 103
A. Ownership of Service Marks
The first requirement that the plaintiff asserting a service mark in-
fringement claim must satisfy is that he or she is the legal owner of the
service mark. 1°4 In the common law, since service mark protection
arises from use, the general rule is that if the plaintiff can establish that
he or she was the first user in commerce of that particular service mark
102. In Estate of Presley the estate claimed that Russen's activity infringed on the estate's
common law service mark rights and the estate's common law trademark rights. 513 F.
Supp. at 1362. The court chose, however, to concentrate its attention on the estate's service
mark infringement claim. Before focusing on the service mark claim, the court noted that
the same marks that were asserted as service marks might also be trademarks which identi-
fied goods or particular products licensed by either the estate or Presley himself. Id at 1363.
The recognition by the Estate of Presley court that a service mark may also serve as a
trademark affords additional protection to the would-be service mark litigant. Many celeb-
rities license their name and photograph in connection with matters tangentially related to
their primary (entertainment or athletic) service. For example, the right of publicity in-
fringement in the Elvis Presley line of cases typically concerned the production and market-
ing of Elvis Presley memorabilia such as posters and statuettes. See, e.g., Pro Arts, 579 F.2d
215 (Presley posters); Creative Card, 444 F. Supp. 279 (Presley posters); Memphis Develop-
ment Foundation, 441 F. Supp. 1323 (Presley statuettes). Recognizing that celebrities have
common law service mark and common law trademark rights in their names and likenesses
permits these celebrities or their heirs to assert either a service mark infringement claim or a
trademark infringement claim. The service mark infringement claim halts the promotion
and advertising of an actual performance which imitates the celebrity, whereas a trademark
infringement claim stops the production and sale of memorabilia (posters, buttons, key
chains, etc.) which infringes on the holder's trademark. See, e.g., Wyatt Earp Enters, Inc. v.
Sackman, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (plaintiff, the producer of the television
series "The Life and Legend of Wyatt Earp", successfully enjoined a children's clothing
manufacturer from merchandising children's playsuits under the name, mark, and symbol
"Wyatt Earp"). One commentator has suggested that a trademark owner's "Right of Iden-
tity", that is, the owner's right to protect his or her trademark's "persona", is analogous to an
entertainer's right of publicity. See Winner, Right of Identity: Right of Publicity and Protec-
tionfor a Trademark's "Persona", 71 TRADE-MARK REP 197 (1981).
103. See Scott Paper Co., 589 F.2d 1225; Perfectform Corp v. Perfect Brassiere Co., 256
F.2d 736 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 919 (1958); Caesars World, 490 F. Supp. 818; Foto-
mat, 425 F. Supp. 693; Qonaar, 422 F. Supp. 905.
104. If the plaintiff asserting a service mark infringement claim can show that his or her
mark was registered under either the Lanham Act or the applicable state statute, this fact
establishes a rebuttable presumption that the mark is both valid and owned by the plaintiff.
See supra note 88.
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then he or she has made a strong showing of ownership.° 5 In addition,
however, the plaintiff must allege that the service mark is still being
used in commerce to identify the plaintiff's services."° The rationale
here is that a service mark has no existence independent of the service
in connection with which the mark is used.' 07 If the plaintiff shows that
there has been no severance between the existence of the service mark
and its actual use, then the plaintiff still maintains title in the mark.'
Although service marks are considered, intellectual property, they,
nevertheless, are accorded traditional property right protection ° and
are fully alienable and descendible." I Thus, unlike the situation in a
right of publicity context, descendibility of the service mark never be-
comes an issue. Title to the service mark simply passes to the adminis-
trator or executor of the estate"' who is entrusted with the duty of
105. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 100 (1918); Hanover Star
Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415 (1916). Ownership is often an essential require-
ment to prove standing. As the Supreme Court stated in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
(1975), the test to determine standing is "whether the plaintiff has 'alleged such a persona!
stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of federal court juris-
diction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers of his behalf." Id at 498-99
(citations omitted). Proof of the ownership of the service mark at issue in the infringement
claim aids in satisfying the "personal stake" requirement.
106. See, e.g., La Societe Anonyme des Parfums Le Galion v. Jean Patou, Inc., 495 F.2d
1265, 1271-72 (2d Cir. 1974) (defendant constructively surrendered exclusive right to a
trademark when evidence showed that defendant's federal trademark registration expired
and that defendant made only 89 sales of trademarked perfume in a 20 year period).
107. United Drug, 248 U.S. at 97.
108. The proponent of the mark must also show that the use of the mark has been delib-
erate and continuous and not sporadic, casual, or transitory. See Jean Patou, 495 F.2d at
1272. See also R. CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES,
§ 76.2(d) (3d ed. 1969).
109. See Hanover Star Milling, 240 U.S. at 413 (trademark owner's common law right of
exclusive use of the trademark may be classified as a property right; however, the right
grows out of use and not mere adoption). See also MCCARTHY, supra note 84, § 2:6.
Section 654 of the California Civil Code defines property. It states: "the ownership of a
thing is the right of one or more persons to possess and use it to the exclusion of others. In
this Code, the thing of which there may be ownership is called property." CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 654 (West 1982). Section 655 of the California Civil Code goes further and indicates that
trademarks are "property" within the meaning of section 654. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 654-
655 (West 1982).
110. Mr. Justice Holmes recognized that "in a qualified sense the [trade]-mark is prop-
erty, protected and alienable." Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 273 U.S. 629, 632
(1927).
111. See Dilworth v. Hake, 64 S.W.2d 829 (trade name passed from decedent to the exec-
utrix of the estate as part of the assets of the estate) (Tex. Civ. App. 1933). Cf Ward-
Chandler Bldg. Co. v. Caldwell, 8 Cal. App. 2d 375, 377, 47 P.2d 758, 759-60 (1935) (trade-
mark may be preserved and assigned where the mark is deprived of all personal aspects and
used in connection with the operation of a business).
19821
LO YOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
preserving and managing the assets of the estate. 1 2 A valid service
mark classification, in addition to or instead of a right of publicity clas-
sification, therefore, grants the owner of the service mark a distinct le-
gal advantage. In the former, title to a valid service mark will pass to
the estate regardless of whether the jurisdiction prohibits a descendible
right of publicity.
B. Likelihood of Confusion
The most critical requirement which the plaintiff asserting a com-
mon law service mark infringement claim must establish is Ia likelihood
of confusion as to the source of the services.' 13 Likelihood of confusion
exists when members of the consuming public viewing the service mark
may assume that the service it represents is associated with the source
of a different service identified by a similar mark.' 4 The question then
is not whether the services per se would be confused, but whether pro-
spective purchasers of the services are likely to believe that the services
originate or are performed by the same party. '
To answer this question, courts have developed workable formulas
which account for the essential factors necessary to the determina-
tion. These formulas evaluate the strength of the plaintiffs marks,
the similarity between the plaintiffs and the defendant's marks, the evi-
dence of actual confusion by members of the consuming public, the
intent of the defendant in adopting the mark, and whether the services
are marketed through the same channels of trade." 1
7
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1957).
113. Seegenerally Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d
200, 204-05 (2d Cir. 1979); Scott Paper Co., 589 F.2d at 1231; Caesars World, 490 F. Supp. at
823-24.
114. Scott Paper Co., 589 F.2d at 1229.
115. See E. VANDENBURGH, TRADEMARK LAW AND PROCEDURE, § 5.2 at 139-40 (2d ed.
1968) [hereinafter cited as VANDENBURGH).
116. A court will balance these factors through the eyes of "ordinary purchasers, buying
with ordinary caution." McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 251 (1878). Of course, by defini-
tion, when employing the "ordinary purchaser" as the guide to determine a likelihood of
confusion, the court is required to speculate regarding the impressions each of these factors
has on the ordinary purchaser. Because of this speculation as well as the case by case ap-
proach used by the courts, it often becomes difficult to see any consistency within the case
law. Compare Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 439' F. Supp. 1022 (D. Del.
1977), rev,-d 589 F.2d 1225 (3d Cir. 1978) (Scott I), with Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid
Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225 (3d Cir. 1978) (Scott II). Nevertheless, it is this very burden of
speculation thrust on the court that affords it the opportunity to balance the equities of the
competing claims and draw reasonable conclusions based on a totality of the circumstances.
117. Additional factors considered by the courts include the price of the goods, the length
of time the defendant has used the mark without evidence of actual confusion arising, the
extent to which the targets of the parties' sales efforts are the same, and the relationship of
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As discussed in the above section the protectability of the plain-
tiff's marks, the strength or weakness of the plaintiffs marks is an im-
portant consideration in a showing of likelihood of confusion. Strength
refers to the ability of a service mark to identify, in the eyes of the
consuming public, goods as emanating from a particular, although pos-
sibly anonymous, source.'" In a likelihood of confusion, assessment,
time, goodwill and the amount of energy and capital expended in the
course of marketing a service all contribute to the development of a
strong service mark. Generally, strong service marks are given a wide
range of protection over related services while weaker marks are given
a narrower range of protection." 19
The similarity between the service marks at issue is another rele-
vant factor. The greater the similarity between the plaintiffs and de-
fendant's marks, the greater the likelihood of confusion. 2 ° An
evaluation of the similarity of the marks in question requires a determi-
the goods in the mind of the public because of the similarity of function. See, e.g., AMF,
Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979); Scott H, 589 F.2d at 1229;
Scarves by Vera, Inc., v. Todo Imports Ltd., 544 F.2d 1167, 1173 (2d Cir. 1976); Union
Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 381-82 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830
(1976); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 434 F.2d 794, 800 (9th Cir. 1970);
Caesars World, 490 F. Supp. at 823-24; Scott 1, 439 F. Supp. at 1036-37; Fotomat 425 F.
Supp. at 703; McNeil Laboratories, Inc. v. American Home Prods Corp., 416 F. Supp. 804,
806 (D.N.J. 1976).
In Bell v. American Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 14 Cal. App. 3d 289, 92 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1971),
a trade name infringement action initiated by the American College of Trial Lawyers
against the American Trial Lawyers Association, the California Court of Appeal formulated
a nonexhaustive checklist to determine whether a likelihood of confusion existed under the
common law. The checklist included an inquiry into whether actual confusion in the mind
of the average prudent man had occurred, a side-by-side comparison of the names in ques-
tion, and an inquiry into whether the defendant knew about the plaintiffs mark before the
defendant used its mark. Id at 309-10, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 241-42. The court posited that, in
any event, the critical factor in a likelihood of confusion determination was the impression
the mark as a whole created, by sight, sound, or meaning, on the average, reasonably pru-
dent member of the relevant public. Id at 307, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 240.
118. See MCGREGOR-DONIGER, INC. v. DRIZZLE, INC., 599 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir.
1979). The McGregor-Doniger court identified and arranged in ascending order of strength
four categories of marks-generic, descriptive, suggestive, and arbitrary and fanciful. Id
The relative strength or weakness of a descriptive personal name service mark, such as an
entertainer's name, depends on the amount of secondary meaning the name has acquired in
the public's mind.
119. See Family Circle, Inc. v. Family Circle Assoc., Inc., 332 F.2d 534, 540 (3d Cir.
1964) (distinctive or unique marks are given a wider range of protection against infringe-
ment than less distinct marks because distinctive marks create a deeper, longer-lasting im-
pression on the public's consciousness).
120. See Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor Exch. of Houston, Inc., 628 F.2d 500, 505 (5th Cir.
1980) (after considering the overall impression created by the marks Tex-On and EXXON,
the court concluded that the marks were not sufficiently similar in design to find a likelihood
of confusion).
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nation based on a totality of the individual features,' 2' including a
comparison with respect to similarity of appearance, pronounciation,
and meaning. One commentator has suggested that the similarity of
service marks evaluation involves nothing more than an "eyeball" test
on the part of the finder of fact. 2E The test, by definition, requires the
finder of fact to view the conflicting marks and evaluate the likelihood
of confusion based on the overall impression which the marks create. 
23
Although a showing of actual confusion by members of the ordi-
nary public is not required, 24 it is strongly recommended that a com-
plainant always endeavor to discover and assert the best possible
evidence of actual confusion in any controversy. 25 The plaintiff may
show actual confusion by resorting to such means as interview or
surveys. Sometimes an inartfully drafted answer to a complaint may
serve as an admission by the defendant that his or her mark actually
confused members of the consuming public. This occurred in Ball v.
American Trial Lawyers Association . 126 In that case the defendant ac-
knowledged that as a result of the great publicity sought and attained
for its name, a member of the public may associate the defendant's
name with the plaintiffs services when that member later encounters
the plaintiff's organization, "The American College of Trial
Lawyers". 1
27
The determination of the defendant's intent in his or her adoption
of the infringing mark is often difficult. However, if the plaintiff can
establish that the defendant adopted the mark in question with the in-
tention of capitalizing on the plaintiff's goodwill, that fact alone may be
dispositive of the issue of confusing similarity. 128  Essentially, it
amounts to the defendant's admission that the respective service marks
are interchangeable. Without an absolute showing of the defendant's
intent, the court may nevertheless draw reasonable inferences regard-
121. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 729 comment b (1938).
122. MCCARTHY, supra note 84, § 23:7.
123. Id. See also supra note 117.
124. See Caesars World, 490 F. Supp. at 825.
125. See VANDENBURGH, supra note 115, § 5.52; GILSON, supra note 2, § 5.01.
126. 14 Cal. App. 3d 289, 92 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1971).
127. Id. at 309, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 241.
128. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 729 comment f (1938). Although proof of fraudulent
intent is very helpful in a likelihood of confusion showing, the California courts have con-
sistently held that fraudulent intent is not required to prove either a trademark or a service
mark infringement. See Stork Restaurant v. Shati, 166 F.2d 348, 360 (9th Cir. 1948); Dodge
Stationery Co. v. Dodge, 145 Cal. 380, 390, 78 P. 879, 883 (1904); Ball, 14 Cal. App. 3d at
306, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40; MacSweeney Enters., Inc. v. Tarantino, 235 Cal. App. 2d 549,
561, 45 Cal. Rptr. 546, 554 (1965).
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ing the defendant's intent.' 29 In Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesar's Pal-
ace, 130 for example, the court drew reasonable inferences and found
that the defendant intended to adopt its infringing service mark
"Caesars Palace" when it was shown that the defendant had a prior
awareness of plaintiff's marks, and the defendant's own marks were
virtually identical in design and name.13'
The similarity of service factor does not require the plaintiff to
show that members of the consuming public actually believe that the
service is performed by the plaintiff. Rather, the test is whether ordi-
nary purchasers generally familiar with the plaintiff's service marks are
likely to believe that the defendant's service mark is somehow related
to the entity that provides the plaintiff's services. 32 Thus, if members
of the consuming public are inclined to believe that the defendant's
service is licensed by the plaintiff, then this is sufficient to establish the
similarity of service factor. In Boston Professional Hockey Association
v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc. ,12 for example, the court con-
cluded that since members of the consuming public were likely to be-
lieve that Dallas Cap & Emblem was licensed by the Boston Bruins
Hockey team to manufacture Boston Bruins emblems, the test for simi-
larity of services was met.'
34
After an examination of all of these relevant factors, the court will
ultimately look through "the eyes of ordinary purchasers buying with
ordinary caution"'' 35 to determine whether a likelihood of confusion
exists. Since a "likelihood of confusion" analysis is often a conjectural
process subject to the vagaries of consumer purchasing, the fictional
"ordinary purchaser" enables the court to analyze realistically the im-
pact the defendant's alleged infrining mark has on the plaintiff's service
mark and established goodwill.
C. Validity and Protectability of Service Marks
The final requirement that a plaintiff alleging a service mark in-
129. California has adopted the familiar tort concept that every person is presumed to
intend the natural and foreseeable consequence of his actions. See Dodge Stationery Co.,
145 Cal. at 390, 78 P. at 883. As a result, the California courts have wide latitude in drawing
the reasonable inferences necessary in determining the defendant's intent. See also MCCAR-
THY, supra note 84, § 23:33(D); GILSON, supra note 2, § 5.03.
130. 490 F. Supp. 818 (D.N.J. 1980).
131. Id at 824-26.
132. See, e.g., Exxon Corp., 628 F.2d at 504; Schmid Laboratories v. Young Drug Prods.
Corp., 482 F. Supp. 14, 19-20 (D.N.J. 1979).
133. 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975).
134. Id. at 1012.
135. McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 251 (1878).
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fringement must establish is that his or her service mark is valid and
protectable. A service mark is valid and protectable when it is adopted
and employed in connection with the rendering of services in order to
identify those services and distinguish them from the services of
others. 36 The mark can be a word, name,137 symbol, 38 or device, and
as long as the mark is used in connection with the services, it may
achieve protected status. 39 However, the service mark must not be the
service itself, but rather a designation of the source of those services.'40
A showing by the plaintiff that the mark was used in promoting,
advertising, or selling the services generally warrants service mark rec-
ognition and protection.' 4 ' Although a court uses its powers to draw
reasonable inferences from all the facts to determine whether a service
mark is valid, it is critical that the plaintiff show how the service mark
was used in relation to the identification of services. 142 A court will not
recognize a mark that is only tangentially related to the services ren-
136. See Caesars World, 490 F. Supp. at 822.
137. A name achieves service mark status not because it identifies an individual but be-
cause it identifies a service provided by that individual or his or her affiliates. See In re
Carson, 197 U.S.P.Q. 554 (T.T.A.B. 1977) (the name "Johnnie Carson" is a valid service
mark not because it identifies the comedian John W. Carson but because it identifies the
entertainment services which Carson provides. See also Capetola v. Orlando, 426 F. Supp.
616 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Five Platters v. Purdie, 419 F. Supp. 372 (D. Md. 1976). But see In re
Lee Trevino Enterprises, Inc., 182 U.S.P.Q. 253 (T.T.A.B. 1974) (the name "Lee Trevino"
was held merely to identify a famous professional golfer of that name and not services that
he may have rendered).
138. See Boston Professional Hockey, 510 F.2d 1004; Fotomat, 425 F. Supp. 693; In re
Pierce, 164 U.S.P.Q. 369 (T.T.A.B. 1970).
139. See Orlando, 426 F. Supp. 616; (E.D. Pa. 1977); Five Platters, 419 F. Supp. 372; In re
Carson, 197 U.S.P.Q. 554.
140. Since a service mark is designed to inform the public of the origin of the services and
not to protect the owner's ability to render those services, the service mark cannot be the
service itself. Thus, in In re Lee Trevino, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board refused to
grant service mark protection because the asserted mark was only descriptive of the endorse-
ments which Trevino gave. The mark did not inform the public of the origin of the services.
182 U.S.P.Q. at 254. See also Cebu Ass'n of California, Inc. v. Santo Nino de Cebu U.S.A.,
Inc., 95 Cal. App. 3d 129, 137, 157 Cal. Rptr. 102, 107 (1979) (service mark must be distinc-
tive, separate, and apart from identity of service itself, so as to permit many others to offer
the same service; one cannot appropriate identity of service mark or else all others would be
excluded from the field); KGB, Inc. v. Giannoulas, 104 Cal. App. 3d 844, 856-57, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 571, 582-83 (1980) (to be entitled to service mark protection, service mark must be
stationary and unchanging; since former employee of radio station had appeared in a chick-
en costume similar, though not identical, to radio station's chicken costume and developed
his own distinctive mannerisms while appearing in costume, a service mark infringement did
not occur).
141. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 205-06; Caesars World, 490 F.
Supp. at 822; James Burrough, 540 F.2d at 274.
142. See Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 381, 280 N.W.2d 129, 131
(1979) (to establish a common law trade name infringement, plaintiff was required to show
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dered without a showing that the mark actually identified the services
provided.
14 3
The extent of protection afforded in a service mark infringement
action initially depends on the classification of the mark itself.'" One
classification of marks, those which either are descriptive or which use
common words or symbols, must acquire secondary meaning' 45
through use before protection is afforded.'6 The other classification of
marks, inherently distinctive marks,'47 gain protected status upon their
first use in commerce. 4 8 It is unnecessary for a plaintiff who owns an
inherently distinctive mark to prove that his or her mark has acquired
secondary meaning.' 49 Thus, in Caesars World, 5 ' the plaintiff's serv-
ice marks consisting of the phrase "Caesars Palace" written in a Ro-
manesque letter style 15 1 were protectable as inherently distinctive
marks because "the marks are unique, arbitrary, and
nondescriptive."' 52
In some cases where the service mark infringement claim is used
as an alternative to the right of publicity, the secondary meaning re-
quirement may be an obstacle to the assertion of a valid claim. A
plaintiff asserting a personal name as a service mark, such as the name
Elvis Presley, must show that because the marks have been used for
that his nickname designated his vocation or occupation as a sports figure and that the use of
his name on a shaving gel for women created a likelihood of confusion as to sponsorship).
143. McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1133 (2d Cir. 1979). Afford-
ing protection to marks bearing only a tangential relation to a service would not advance the
primary goal which service marks are designed to achieve-ensuring that the consuming
public is not misled into believing that the services it associates with a particular mark are
the services it wants.
144. See Caesars World, 490 F. Supp. at 822.
145. The word "secondary" in "secondary meaning" does not refer to the relative impor-
tance of a descriptive as opposed to an inherently distinctive mark. Instead, "secondary"
refers to the passage of time. Thus, material which originally may have had only descriptive
significance now with the passage of time has acquired a secondary meaning which informs
the consuming public what the origin of the services are. See VANDENBURGH, supra note
115, § 4.70; G & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 F. 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1912). See also
GILSON, supra note 2, § 2.09.
146. Caesars World, 490 F. Supp. at 822.
147. Inherently distinctive marks are also called technical marks. Id Fanciful or arbi-
trary words and symbols warrant the inherently distinctive mark classification. See Scott
Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1022, 1034 (D. Del. 1977), rev'don other
grounds, 589 F.2d 1225 (3d Cir. 1978).
148. 490 F. Supp. at 822.
149. 1d at 823.
150. 490 F. Supp. at 818.
151. Id at 823.
152. Id In Caesars World, the court also noted that the plaintiff's service marks were
invented solely for use in connection with its resort hotel. Id at 822.
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such a long period of time in connection with the advertising and pro-
motion of certain entertainment services, the mark has acquired a sec-
ondary meaning which distinguishes those entertainment services from
any other entertainment service.1 53  This was the result reached in
Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. Todo Imports Ltd., Inc. , where the court
recognized that although the plaintiff's trademark "Vera" was a com-
mon personal name, 5 5 the plaintiff established secondary meaning in
the eyes of the consuming public by showing that its sales figures and
advertising expenses reflected a wide public acceptance of the mark
"Vera. 156
III. BRIDGING THE GAP: ESTATE OF PRESLEY V RUSSEN
In evaluating the estate's causes of action, the Estate of Presley
court first turned to the right of publicity issue. The court concluded
that the estate established a likelihood of success on the merits for the
right of publicity claim because New Jersey courts have recognized and
supported an individual's right to prevent the unauthorized, commer-
cial appropriation of one's name and likeness'57 and because the right
of publicity, as it is known today, protects against theatrical imita-
tions. 5 8  Nevertheless, the court denied the preliminary injunction
based on the right of publicity claim because the estate failed to estab-
lish an irreparable injury.5 9 Concluding that the right of publicity is
designed to protect an individual's exclusive right to reap the commer-
cial benefits of his or her persona, the court asserted that the estate
must establish that Russen's activity somehow impeded the estate's
ability to capitalize on Presley's persona. 6 ° Moreover, since in a right
of publicity claim the court is often asked to balance the societal con-
siderations of free expression against the individual's right to capitalize
153. See Five Platters, 419 F. Supp. at 381. See also GILsoN, supra note 2, § 2.08.
154. 544 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1976) ("VERA" for scarves enforced against "VERA" for
toiletries). See also Jerrico, Inc. v. Jerry's Inc., 376 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
155. 544 F.2d at 1173.
156. Id
157. 513 F. Supp. at 1354-55.
158. Id. at 1355-56. Accord Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day and Night Co., Inc., 523
F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'don other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982). Critical
to the court's determination that the estate's right of publicity protected against Russen's
imitation of a Presley performance was the conclusion that Russen's activity was commercial
in nature rather than being newsworthy, informative, or contributing to the public debate of
political or social issues. Had Russen's production stemmed from the latter, it is likely that
he would have been immune from liability because this activity would have been protected
under the first amendment.
159. 513 F. Supp. at 1379.
160. Id. at 1378.
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on his or her persona, the need for showing a bona fide injury is height-
ened. '6 Thus, since the estate failed to establish irreparable injury
here, it was necessary for the court to explore the estate's alternative
causes of action.
The critical alternative cause of action which the estate asserted
was the service mark infringement claim. 62 As explained in Part II
above, a plaintiff asserting the service mark claim must establish that
he or she owned the marks, that the marks were valid and protectable,
and that the defendant's use of a similar mark was likely to confuse
members of the consuming public as to the source of the defendant's
services. 163
161. ld at 1378-79.
162. Id at 1361-72.
163. The estate was also successful in alleging violations of both the New Jersey common
law of unfair competition, and section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976).
The court concluded that under New Jersey common law service mark infringement claims
are but a part of the broader law of unfair competition; consequently, there are more restric-
tions on service mark claims than on unfair competition claims. Thus, since the estate had
proven a likelihood of success on the merits regarding its service mark infringement claim, it
had also proven a likelihood of success on the merits concerning its common law unfair
competition claim. As part of its common law unfair competition claim, the estate also
alleged that the "Big El Show" itself, and not merely the infringement of the service marks
in question, constituted unfair competition because the audience viewing the performance is
necessarily deceived into believing it is dealing with a service of the estate of Elvis Presley.
The court was unconvinced that the doctrine of unfair competition was designed to prohibit
the performance of an individual imitating a famous performer like Presley, particularly
since the original performer was no longer living. The court held that the unfair competition
doctrine, just as the service mark infringement doctrine, could be invoked only to prohibit
the use of the estate's marks in the promotion and advertising of Russen's production.
Similarly, with respect to the section 43(a) claim, the court held that although section
43(a) may proscribe competitive torts not covered by trademark infringement law or com-
mon law unfair competition, as a general rule, the same facts which would support an action
for service mark infringement or common law unfair competition would also support an
action for unfair competitive practices under section 43(a). Therefore, since the estate had
proven a likelihood of success on the merits with respect to the common law service mark
infringement claim, it also established a violation of section 43(a). The court correctly ob-
served that section 43(a) created a distinct federal statutory tort not limited solely to trade-
mark or service mark infringement claims. Section 43(a) was designed to afford broad
protection against various forms of unfair competition and false advertising. It remains to
be seen whether section 43(a) will have utility as an alternative to the right of publicity in
those cases where even a ommon law service mark cannot be established. See GILSON,
supra note 2, § 7.02; Note, Section 43(a) of the Lanhzam Act: Its Development and Potential, 3
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 327 (1972). The court offered suggestions as to how Russen could conduct
his activity without violating section 43(a). These suggestions stressed the importance of
Russen making clear on the face of the advertising that his production was not affiliated
with, sponsored by, or in any way connected with the same people who provided actual
Elvis Presley entertainment services. This would facilitate achieving the laudable goals of
section 43(a)--preventing and alleviating deceptive and misleading advertising and stressing
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A. Ownership of Service Marks
In Estate of Presley, after a detailed, methodical analysis of the
estate's common law service mark infringement claim,1 64 the court con-
cluded that the estate possessed valid service marks in Elvis Presley's
persona; 65 in the names "Elvis," "Elvis Presley," and "Elvis in Con-
cert," 16 6 and in the TCB logo.' 67 The court was, however, cautious in
concluding that the estate owned the service marks. This conclusion
came only after a lengthy discussion regarding the contractual arrange-
ment between the estate, the Boxcar Corp. (Presley's publicity corpora-
tion), and Boxcar's licensee, Factors. 68 The court recognized that the
agreements, the estate-Boxcar arrangement and the Boxcar-Factors
contract, were terminable. 69 Upon termination, the existing rights to
the Presley name, likeness, image, and service marks reverted to the
estate.
70
B. Validity and Protectability of Service Marks
The court concluded that with the exception of one of the asserted
service marks, "The King", 7 ' the estate established that the names
"Elvis," "Elvis Presley," and "Elvis in Concert;"'
172 the TCB logo; 173
and the likeness and image of Presley embodied in the "Elvis Pose"
were valid service marks.' 74 Each had appeared in connection with the
the need for providing the public with truthful information about the services and their
sources of sponsorship.
164. 513 F. Supp. at 1361-72.
165. Id at 1363-64. The estate maintained that any likeness or image of Elvis Presley
serves as a service mark; however, the court was unwilling to accept such a broad position.
The court, however, did conclude that an illustration of Elvis Presley dressed in one of his
typical jumpsuits and holding a microphone in a singing pose was likely to be construed as a
service mark. The court referred to this service mark as the "Elvis Pose" and concluded
that, indeed, it had been used in connection with the promotion and advertising of Elvis
Presley entertainment services to identify those services. Id
166. Id. at 1363.
167. Id
168. Id at 1345-58.
169. Id at 1347.
170. Id at 1348.
171. Id at 1363. Although the court recognized that Elvis Presley's nickname was "The
King", the estate failed to present sufficient evidence showing that "The King" identified the
services provided by Presley. If the estate had demonstrated that the phrase "The King" was
not only Presley's nickname, but was also used in connection with radio or television promo-
tions for concerts, tours, records, etc., then the court would have found the requisite nexus
between the name and the identification of services.
172. Id
173. Id
174. Id at 1364.
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advertising of concerts or performances," the conduct of day-to-day
business affairs, 176 or the production of goods (i.e. records). 1
77
For a person's name to achieve valid service mark protection, it
generally must acquire secondary meaning and be identified with the
services offered. T'7  The Estate of Pres.'ey court concluded that, indeed,
the names "Elvis," "Elvis Presley," and "Elvis in Concert,"' 179 as well
as the "Elvis Pose", had acquired a secondary meaning.' 80 Thus, these
words were afforded traditional service mark protection. The court
also concluded that the TCB logo warranted service mark protection
since the mark could be characterized as inherently distinctive.' 8'
C Likelihood of Confusion
After evaluating the necessary elements in a likelihood of confu-
sion determination, the Estate of Presley court concluded that the estate
had made a strong showing of likelihood of confusion.'82 The court
found that the estate's service marks were very strong, had acquired a
great distinctiveness in the eyes of the consuming public, and unques-
tionably identified the entertainment services provided by Elvis Presley
or his estate.'83 The court also found that both the estate's marks and
Russen's marks were extremely similar.'8 4 Although the court deter-
mined that all of the defendant's marks were confusingly similar to
those owned by the estate, it took particular notice of the similarity
between actual Elvis Presley photographs and "Big El Show" promo-
tional information.'85 The conclusion that the marks were extremely
similar mitigated against the defendant's claim that there was no likeli-
hood of confusion.
The evaluation of the "similarity of services" and the "similarity
of channels of trade" factors was a bit more difficult for the court. Al-
though both Russen and the estate were involved in the offering of en-
tertainment services, 86 Russen claimed that since most people
175. Id at 1363 (names).
176. Id. (the TCB logo appearing on Presley letterheads and business cards).
177. Id at 1363-64 (both the names and the "Elvis Pose" used to advertise and sell record
albums).
178. See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
179. 513 F. Supp. at 1364.
180. Id at 1365.
181. d. at 1364. See also supra note 147-52 and accompanying text.
182. 513 F. Supp. at 1372.
183. Id. at 1367.
184. Id
185. Id
186. Id at 1368-69.
19821
LO YOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
recognized that Elvis Presley died, this fact alone eliminated the con-
clusion that members of the consuming public were likely to be con-
fused. 187 Russen asserted that this was particularly true with respect to
a showing of similarity of services or similarity of channels of trade. 88
The court recognized, however, that although Russen primarily offered
live entertainment services in the form of a stage show' 89 and the estate
primarily offered entertainment services in the form of video or audio
recordings, 90 the fact that the defendant could make a film of the "Big
El Show" strongly suggested that both the services and channels of
trade were extremely similar.' 9 ' The court also recognized that since
members of the consuming public might be led to believe that the "Big
El Show" was authorized or sponsored by the estate, a showing of simi-
larity of services and trade was established.
92
These four factors combined-the strength of the estate's marks,
the similarity of the marks, the similarity of services, and the similarity
of channels of trade-enabled the estate to establish with sufficient cer-
tainty a likelihood of confusion.193
IV. CONCLUSION
By virtue of the amount of money involved in the entertainment
and professional athletic industries, along with a public eager to praise
its celebrities, an environment conducive to commercial parasites mis-
appropriating a celebrity's property rights is created. While a right of
publicity claim may provide solace for some injured plaintiffs, often the
right is inadequate to protect the full commercial interests of either the
celebrity or the estate. In those jurisdictions placing some limitation on
the right of publicity or in situations when the plaintiff fails to satisfy
the requirements for a preliminary injunction to issue, Estate of Presley
v. Russen represents a viable alternative which will provide relief in the
wake of a traditional right of publicity claim. Estate of Presley ad-
vances the fundamental values of protecting the plaintiffs goodwill,
providing for an informed consuming public, and compelling the de-
fendant to create a quality production without resorting to deceiving
the public or piggybacking on the plaintiff's goodwill.
187. Id at 1371.
188. Id at 1369-70.
189. Id at 1369.
190. Id at 1368.
191. Id at 1369 n.34.
192. Id at 1371.
193. Id at 1372.
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The service mark infringement claim should be asserted with cau-
tion, both because not all courts may be as receptive to this alternative
as the Estate of Presley court and because the plaintiff still must show a
valid service mark identifying the services offered as well as a likeli-
hood of success on the merits. There remains little doubt, however,
that the viability of Estate of Presley will be tested shortly, concomitant
with the expansion of the right of publicity.

